In the Name of Allah, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful     Madam Chairperson, Executive Secretary, Distinguished delegates,               I would like to express my gratitude to Your Excellency Ambassador Faouzia Mebarki, Permanent Representative of Algeria for your able leadership, and relentless efforts as the chairperson of the Preparatory Commission in this year. Let me assure you of full cooperation and support of my delegation in discharge of your mandate.             I also wish to commend the Executive Secretary, Dr. Lassina Zerbo, for his diligent and professional leadership as well as informative opening remarks on the PTS activities. Indeed, the continuity of the PTS professional work, despite restrictions and difficult situation posed by the Covid-19 pandemic, is highly valued.             I would also like to commend the Chairs of the two Working Groups and the Advisory Group for their work during this period. Since the second term of Dr. Schulze as the Chairperson of the WGB will end this year, my delegation would like to appreciate him for his relentless efforts to lead the WGB during last 6 years and wish him success for his future endeavors.             My delegation associates itself with the statement of the Group of 77 and China, delivered by the representative of the Philippines. I would like to raise some further points in my national capacity as follow: Madam Chairperson, The Islamic Republic of Iran reiterates its long standing and principled position on the need for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons. In this regard, we reaffirm our strong support for the objectives of the CTBT, as enshrined in its preamble “towards nuclear disarmament and against the proliferation of nuclear weapons in all its aspects with the ultimate goal of eliminating those weapons, and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. We also firmly believe that the cessation of all nuclear weapon test explosions and all other nuclear explosions as well as ending the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons, is the first necessary step towards nuclear disarmament. Regrettably, after more than two decades of the Treaty’s adoption, achieving this objective has become ever more elusive. If the objectives of the Treaty were to be fully realized, the continued commitment of all States Signatories, especially the Nuclear Weapon States, to nuclear disarmament would be essential. In this regard, we believe that the Nuclear Weapon States have a special responsibility towards entry into force of the Treaty. Unfortunately, in the past few years, the international community was witnessing a destructive approach towards CTBT by the United States. In this regard, my delegation expresses its deep concern, especially over the reports that senior officials of the United States have discussed the possibility of conducting nuclear test explosions, which if carried out, would not only be considered as a vivid breach of the global moratorium on nuclear weapon test explosions, but also severely undermine the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, thereby the international peace and security. We further noted with grave concern that the U.S. Senate panel approved $10 million budget to prepare for such a nuclear test. My delegation calls upon the U.S. to comply with its commitments in safeguarding the purposes and objectives of the disarmament Treaties. My delegation takes note of the 2021 Budget updated proposals. It is imperative that a reasonable balance in allocating budget and human resources for all elements of verification regime including IMS, IDC and OSI as well as improving the capacity building in States Signatories, in particular developing countries, is necessary in this regard. There is no doubt that some of the activities in 2020 of the PTS might have been affected by the Covid-19 Pandemic, which to our understanding, will also impact the program and budget for the next year. Since such an issue was not reflected in the current Draft of Programme and Budget, my delegation requests the PTS to shed some more light on this issue, which will be useful in our consideration of the draft. Madam Chairperson, On the issue of mobile noble gas measurement system, various views were expressed during previous discussions on this issue. The text of the Treaty speaks itself on this issue; the number and specifications of the IMS stations are defined by the Treaty and that the coverage of the IMS noble gas network shall be confined to the IMS station locations specified in the Treaty. Due to lack of consensus among States Signatories on this issue, until the consensus is reached on the use of such systems, there should be no further development in this regard. Accordingly, we are waiting for the Commission to reach consensus and provide direct and clear guidelines for further activities of the PTS on the issue of noble gas background characterization. The Islamic Republic of Iran appreciates the training and capacity building measures taken by the PTS on verification related issues and strongly supports it. We believe that the situation created by COVID-19 pandemic is an opportunity for the PTS to develop its  E-learning training platform. We request that all training courses include an electronic learning (e-learning) component to facilitate utilization of more experts from Signatory States. Madam Chairperson, On the issue of the appointment of the Executive Secretary, we appreciate your extensive efforts to reach consensus in this process. Although the negotiations on the restoration of voting rights and the procedure for the appointment of the Executive Secretary were carried out in good faith and in a transparent manner to reach the consensus, it is very unfortunate that such good faith approach was hijacked by certain delegations. The main objective of this process was to guarantee the principle of inclusiveness and the broadest participation of State Signatories in the election process of the Executive Secretary. Regrettably, due to the political approach adopted by certain delegations, even the agreement reached in summer was not respected in letters and spirit. Undoubtedly, such non-professional approach has led to widening the division amongst State Signatories. I would like to reiterate that if the financial issue is going to overshadow the true raison d’etre of the Treaty, there would be no incentive for several, if not many, State Signatories to contribute to the PrePcom. In this case, the Treaty and the PrePcom would be left only for the countries who pay their shares. I would like to commend the Advisory Group for its work and contribution in providing the PrepCom with independent advice on its financial, budgetary and administrative matters. The Advisory Group needs to be judged based on its merits not members; it should remain professional, independent, and void of any political orientation. Each State Signatory has a sovereign right in introducing its candidate for membership in the Advisory Group. Unfortunately, since this past summer, the wall of consensus in the decision-making process of the PrepCom is cracking seriously and if continued, would not serve the best interest of the organization. On the issue of “Developing guidelines for holding extraordinary sessions of the Preparatory Commission”, we are aware that the Commission at its 52nd session took note of the proposal presented by a group of countries and agreed to further discuss the issue to be able to provide clear guidelines for holding non-scheduled sessions. My delegation is looking forward to discussing the guidelines with a view to reach a consensus in this regard. One last point that I would like to emphasize here is about the necessity of not restricting ourselves to the States listed in Annex II of the Treaty when we are talking about the universalization of the Treaty. We acknowledge that the Treaty is still in a provisional status, however there are several countries pursuing nuclear activities that neither signed the Treaty nor are in the list of Annex II States. For instance, in the Middle East region, the Saudi Arabia now pursues a nuclear program that in our view falls within the purview of Treaty, which unfortunately has not yet signed it. If the Treaty is going to be true to its nature, it should be respected by all those who have the relevant nuclear program. Thus, the Saudi Arabia has to show its adherence to the spirit of the Treaty by singing the CTBT as soon as possible, as well. Furthermore, the Preparatory Commission is also recommended to discuss the status of States who have the relevant nuclear capability but are still are not listed in annex II of the Treaty. I thank you Madam Chairperson.