It is deeply regrettable that while three sabotage terrorist attacks took place in Iran's nuclear facilities during past one year, the Agency has not yet condemned such heinous acts, as it is required to do so by numerous GC &  UNGA resolutions and even for the sake of its own equipment and properties and the safety and security of its inspectors.    Any decision taken by Iran on Agency’s monitoring equipment is only based on political rather than legal considerations and therefore, the Agency cannot and should not consider it as one of its entitlements.   The JS by the Head of AEOI and the IAES DG on Sep 12 was achieved due to Iran’s good-will to replace the storage media of the “identified equipment”. These activities were performed by the Agency from 2o-22 Sep.   During the discussions in Tehran as well as in Vienna, it was clearly indicated that since that Tessa Karaj Complex is still under security and judicial investigations, the equipment related to this Complex are not included for servicing. That's why the phrase “identified equipment” has been used in the “JS”. Therefore, DG's report on Sep 26 is not accurate and certainly goes beyond the agreed terms of the JS.