Permanent Mission of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations Office and other International Organizations in Vienna   Statement by H.E Reza Najafi, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, before the Board of Governors of the IAEA under Agenda Item 6(f): “NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran” (Vienna, 12 June 2025)   In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful   Madam Chair, At the outset, I would like to acknowledge the Director General’s report on the peaceful nuclear program of Iran. There are serious concerns regarding the content of the report as stated in Explanatory Note submitted by Iran and circulated as document INFCIRC/1297. The Islamic Republic of Iran underscores its commitment to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and its right to peaceful use of nuclear energy under Article IV of the Treaty. Furthermore, despite the cumbersome impediments to the discharge of its obligations under the Treaty, Iran honors its commitments under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) and proceeds with the development of its peaceful nuclear program to meet the domestic needs. Allow me to clarify once again; on the basis of its strong ideological and strategic principles, the Islamic Republic of Iran categorically rejects Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and particularly nuclear weapons, contrary to the sponsors of the resolution. According to the latest Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR 2024), more than 72% of the IAEA verification activities in States with CSAs in force but without APs during 2024, carried out in Iran. More than 20% of Agency’s verification activities have been dedicated to Iran’s nuclear facilities, which account for just three percent of the world’s total nuclear facilities. Such a level of access for the Agency would not have been possible without Iran’s exemplary cooperation. More than 22 million Euros out of the Agency’s regular 39-million-Euro budget for verification in 2024 has been spent exclusively on Iran. The Agency spent 2345 days in Iran during 2024 for verification activities. Now each gram of nuclear material and every centrifuge are under strict monitoring, and they claim Iran is not cooperating! Despite our strong reservations about the content of the Director General’s current report (GOV/2025/25), this very report also recognizes Iran’s cooperation, as it explicitly asserts that “Iran continues to cooperate with the Agency on matters of routine safeguards implementation, and the Agency implements a large verification effort in Iran commensurate with Iran’s nuclear fuel cycle and activities”. The Islamic Republic of Iran reaffirms its commitment to continue its cooperation with the Agency in good faith under the framework of the CSA, aiming to resolve the two remaining outstanding issues, which has no urgency or proliferation risk. This commitment was further emphasized in a letter from the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. H.E. Dr. Pezeshkian, in response to the Director General’s correspondence, where Iran expressed its intention to expand balanced, professional, and comprehensive relations with the Agency in pursuit of its national interests. Distinguished Colleagues, This august body should not overlook the unconstructive approach taken by France, Germany, the United Kingdom (E3) and the United States, a prime example being the resolution presented at the meeting of the Board of Governors in November 2024, which received the lowest number of affirmative votes on record. The resolution was introduced at a time when the Director General was actively engaged in negotiations with senior Iranian officials in Tehran which ultimately led to a mutual understanding aimed at resolving issues of mutual interest and even some measures on 60% enrichment and the inspectors. The aforementioned resolution requests the Director General to provide a so-called comprehensive assessment regarding the “present and past outstanding issues” based on “all available information”. It should be noted that the all “past outstanding issues” were resolved in 2015, Let me read for you para 2 of the Agency’s own report (GOV/2016/8, dated 26 February 2016), which stated “On 2 December 2015, the Director General, in line with the Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme (Road-map), provided a report to the Board of Governors on the final assessment of all past and present outstanding issues, as set out in the Director General’s report in November 2011 (GOV/2011/65). On 15 December 2015, the Board of Governors adopted resolution GOV/2015/72, in which, inter alia, it noted that all activities in the Road-map had been implemented in accordance with the agreed schedule and that “this closes the Board’s consideration of this item”. Therefore, all issues that existed prior to 2015 have been resolved. Regarding the “present outstanding issues”, they were also being addressed through technical discussions between Iran and the Agency as continued in the right direction. Therefore, referring to those resolved issues prior to 2015 lacks any legal basis and is unsubstantiated and unjustified. Unfortunately, in the current report, the Director General repeated allegations of year 2003, 24 times and years 1995, 98, 2000, 2002 and 2004 were referred to 25 times in total. The report does not have even a single reference to the Agency’s own 2015 report. So, if it is not an engineered report then what is it? Iran is currently implementing the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement. The framework for cooperation and provision of information and access to the Agency all are clearly defined therein. Therefore, “all available information” which is mentioned in the report, carries ambiguities that are counterproductive. It is a well-established expectation that the Agency’s assessments be founded solely upon verified, credible, and non-contentious sources. The reliance on unverified information derived from open sources or intelligence provided by the known third parties to the Secretariat is inconsistent with the principles of objectivity, impartiality, and professionalism that underpin the Agency’s mandate. Inclusion of some irrelevant issues in the report is in contradiction with the Agency's professionalism, objectivity and impartiality. The 60% uranium enrichment is not prohibited under the NPT. Iran’s enrichment and stockpile of 60% are fully under the Agency’s monitoring and verification. It should be emphasized that the possession of enriched uranium or plutonium (as it is a case of one Board member with 9000 kg equal to 1500 bombs), irrespective of the amount and enrichment level, does not imply deviation from peaceful purposes, and as was the case with Iran, no diversion was recorded by the Agency. It is highly regrettable and quite astonishing to witness that the Secretariat uses such slanderous language in paragraph 60, apparently a baseless allegation of 20 years age, without informing Iran or providing any substantiated proof or document during these 20 years and suddenly putting in its report. Iran contends that the Agency must avoid such reckless attributions and stand accountable for this slander. Although the Secretariat apologized in the technical briefing for this mistake, this matter would remain on Iran’s agenda until such time as the Agency redresses the affront incurred by such wording, and withdraws the accusations contained therein. The interaction between the Agency and Iran could continue constructively provided that the Agency would carry out its mandate in the professional manner, with an understanding of the sensitivity of the issue. Madam Chair, While manipulating the platform of the Board, the E3 and the United States have made significant efforts to prioritize narrow political interest, rather than serving the aspirations of the international community. Provocative and unconstructive actions of the United States and E3 continued and an escalatory and legally-flawed draft resolution was submitted. We firmly believe that the draft resolution lacks any technical and legal justifications. The following should be noted in this regard: On the remaining Outstanding Issues; the absence of any evidence of diversion to military purposes reaffirms the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program. There is no credible evidence proving that the outstanding issues carry any proliferation risk. Iran’s cooperation enabled the Agency to state that two locations addressed and resolved as reflected in the report of the DG on June 2023. Engagement with the Agency to address the so-called outstanding safeguards issues in relation to two locations has been intensified. Fabricated documents and deep fake information or pictures provided by the known third party as authentic would lead the Agency to conclude wrong and unreliable assessment accordingly. Without taking other possible causes into account, the Agency’s hasty assessment and conclusion on storage of nuclear material and equipment at the claimed locations does not stand to be valid. In light of further cooperation with the Agency, Iran has provided its explanations about probable causes of the presence of uranium particles in the locations. Iran has exhausted all its efforts to discover the origin of such particles in those locations. According to the extensive investigations and examinations, relevant Iranian security authorities have recently discovered further information and documentations confirming that sabotage and/or malicious act have been involved in the contamination of those locations, which were most recently shared with the Agency through a meeting in Tehran. Regarding the Joint Statement of 4 March 2023; in an effort of good faith and even pending the agreement to be reached out on the modalities, the Islamic Republic of Iran allowed the Agency to install 9 surveillance cameras and 2 Enrichment Monitoring Device (EMD). Furthermore, Iran allowed the Secretariat to successfully service the cameras and store the recorded data. The progress achieved arising from the mutual cooperation with the Agency needs to be recognized by the Board of Governors. There should be a clear distinction between legal obligations of Member States under their respective safeguards agreements and their voluntary undertakings, in order to ensure that such voluntary undertakings are not turned into legal safeguards obligations. Regarding the Inspectors; based on Article 9 of the CSA, objecting the designation of inspectors, at any time even after a designation has been made, is a sovereign right of Member States. By no means does this measure impact, directly or indirectly, the ability of the IAEA to conduct its verification and monitoring activities. Iran approved further the designation of 26 new inspectors proposed by the Agency for 2024. More than 70 qualified experts are working in the office for verification in Iran at the Agency and the list of designated inspectors for Iran is now 125 and still there is claim that the Agency suffers from lack of good inspectors. On Modified Code 3.1; Acceptance of implementation of modified Code 3.1 was part of a nuclear deal, reflected in paragraph 65 of Annex I to the JCPOA. Following the U.S. unlawful withdrawal and imposing illegal sanctions as well as the E3/EU’s violation of obligation under the agreement, in exercising its rights under paragraphs 26 and 36 of the JCPOA, Iran ceased all transparency measures beyond its CSA, including Modified Code 3.1. It should be noted that when the JCPOA adopted here in the Board and then in New York by resolution 2231 where it clearly stated this Code as “voluntary measure” no one objected, but now they claim it is an obligation! On Discrepancy; The material balance in the period of 1995-2000 has been intrusively investigated and verified which led to the issuance of satisfactory statements. This issue not only has finally concluded in 2015 (GOV/2015/68), but also verified constantly years later. Building upon such an issue which dates back to 30 years ago, undoubtedly questions the Agency’s verification system as well as undermines the Agency’s credibility. Distinguished Colleagues, The interpretation put forward by the sponsors of the draft resolution concerning the Agency’s functions and the commitments of Member States under the CSA is deeply concerning. It has the potential to set a harmful precedent that could undermine the integrity of Agency’s safeguards system. This approach would not only affect all Member States’ rights under CSA, but also establish a negative precedent that calls into question the inalienable rights of Member States under the IAEA Statute and NPT. Furthermore, it undermines the efforts of Member States to uphold their rights and obligations under this important instrument. Mutual respect among Member States is crucial for fostering common  understanding and paving the way for further engagement. Iran is fully committed to this goal. However, it should be emphasized that any provocative action, undermining the mutual cooperation between Iran and the Agency would be rapidly and powerfully responded as a part of our legitimate right. We must draw lessons from the past experiences, confrontation would fail to achieve any objective, but rather would exacerbates the situation. This legally-flawed draft resolution as tabled with miscalculation, if adopted, would be another mistake. Our reaction would be firm; the Islamic Republic of Iran, immediately, will adopt and implement appropriate measures, in order to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests. We do hope Members of the Board keep distance from this baseless and confrontational draft resolution and cast a negative vote.   I thank you Madam Chair