In the Name of God, the Most Compassionate, the Most Merciful Mr. Chairman, We wish to associate ourselves with the Joint Statement delivered by the representative of the Russian Federation. Our comments and reservations regarding the content of the report of Director General are set out in our Explanatory Note submitted by the Islamic Republic of Iran and circulated as document INFCIRC/1416. Mr. Chairman, On 10 June, this Board adopted a U.S.-sponsored resolution, reaffirming “its support for a diplomatic solution” to Iran’s nuclear program. One week later, the Islamabad MOU was signed. Three weeks later, the U.S. violated the MOU and resumed its aggression. Once again, aggression followed diplomacy. Once again, Iranian civilians—including children at a girls’ primary school and people at a wedding ceremony—have been brutally martyred. And again, our civilian infrastructures, including peaceful safeguarded nuclear facilities, were bombed. The U.S. then imposed further sanctions, re-established its naval blockade, and targeted Iranian ports and ships. And once again, the Security Council and this Agency blindly acted as if nothing had happened. In response, Iran vigorously defended its territory, sovereignty, security, people, and national dignity, and the Iranian people firmly rejected the delusional demand for “unconditional surrender.” And now, once again, we have another DG’s imbalanced report repeating familiar arguments. And once again, another US-sponsored draft resolution to instrumentalize this body. And history repeats itself without learning failures. Following this familiar pattern, today, once again certain Western States expressed their so-called “proliferation concerns.” They shed crocodile tears over proliferation while hypocritically evading even a simple verbal condemnation of unprecedented massive aggressions against peaceful safeguarded nuclear facilities, brutal war crimes, and crimes against humanity. This is not a genuine concern for non-proliferation. It is the weaponization of proliferation term. Yet these same delegations now arrogantly demand that Iran must cooperate and provide access to inspectors even while the aggressive war is ongoing, and the threats of further attacks persist. These demands are made without regard to the realities created by the aggression and the aggressors – the sponsor of the draft resolution. Once again, they demand access to where the access existed for years and without addressing whether such access can now be provided safely. They do not even seriously address the safety of the inspectors. Again, they vocally and unequivocally argue that safeguards implementation can never be suspended under any circumstances. They are deliberately disregarding legal principles allowing for such suspension and ignoring the fact that the Agency itself firstly suspended verification activities by withdrawing inspectors. Under international law, no treaty exists or operates in a legal vacuum. And the CSA is no exception. It cannot be interpreted in isolation or arbitrarily. It must be interpreted coherently, in good faith, and within the broader international legal system. This reflects the principle of “systemic integration” articulated in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Moreover, the application and interpretation of the CSA require consideration of the fundamental principles governing nuclear safety and security. The circumstances before us are exceptional: the two joint U.S.-Israeli regime aggressions against Iranian nuclear facilities in 2025 and 2026 have fundamentally altered the physical and security conditions under which safeguards activities are conducted. Under these circumstances, granting safe access to such facilities is materially impossible. It is impossible, simply for the same reason that compelled the Agency to “unilaterally” stop its verification in Iran. Paragraph 2 of the DG report is particularly telling, stating that the Agency stopped conducting verification in Iran and “decided to withdraw all of its inspectors from Iran for safety reasons.” This is not a political issue. It is a legal and factual reality. They cannot simply be ignored by demanding mechanical implementation of the CSA. Under Articles 61 and 62 of the Vienna Convention, concerning “supervening impossibility of performance” and “fundamental change of circumstances,” performance of a treaty obligation may be suspended when unforeseen events make it impossible or radically change the circumstances. These are the applicable legal principles in the present circumstances.  Mr. Chairman, Let me be unequivocal: Iran has neither stopped nor suspended its safeguards obligations. We are simply unable to perform them under current unprecedented conditions created by these acts of aggression. No country can provide access to facilities under continuing military operations and persistent threats. The Board cannot and must not treat the consequences of aggression as if they do not exist. The burden cannot be placed on Iran while the security consequences of the aggressions are ignored. We are not responsible for the current situation that makes the performance of our obligations impossible. The aggressors should be blamed for this situation. The loss of the Agency’s “continuity of knowledge,” referred to in the DG report, is a direct consequence of the unlawful war and cannot be attributed to Iran. Nor can such circumstances be improperly linked to alleged proliferation concerns while the conditions preventing verification persist. Iran will continue to cooperate with the Agency only to the extent that circumstances permit. We cannot and will not compromise the safety of our people, our facilities, or IAEA inspectors. We will not treat extraordinary wartime conditions as ordinary safeguards circumstances. No country does. We call upon the Board to consider Iran’s position within the complete framework of these legal and factual realities. We also call on the Secretariat to put an end to unprofessional, unobjective, semi-technical, and politically influenced reporting. Accusing Iran of non-cooperation while disregarding the fact that the current situation has been created by the aggressions of the U.S.-Israeli regime is a perfect example of presenting a half-truth. And, as we know, sometimes a half-truth can be the most dangerous form of a lie. Mr. Chairman, Let me now address the US-sponsored draft resolution. This is a political tool, not a technical document. It constitutes a distortion of legal standards and an exercise of political pressure. Legally, it is fundamentally flawed. It falsely claims that Iran is in non-compliance with its CSA. Article XII.C establishes a substantive threshold for a finding of non-compliance, requiring credible and verifiable evidence of a safeguards breach. The draft relies on the DG report, while the same report never stated that the Agency  verified the diversion of nuclear materials. Requiring to “remedy” an alleged violation that the Agency itself cannot establish is inconsistent with the evidentiary standard required under Article XII.C. The draft praises “independence” while aiming at predetermined conclusions. It selectively uses certain elements of the Agency’s record while overlooking relevant findings, including the IAEA’s 2015 “final assessment” on all past and present issues as well as the closure of the file by the Board in December 2015. Obviously, this is selective amnesia. The draft also pretends that the US-Israeli regime aggressions never happened. This alone substantively contradicts the principles of impartiality and consistency. It also makes reference to terminated resolutions of the UN Security Council, while two of its permanent members have formally, repeatedly and unequivocally rejected the restoration of such resolutions. The claims in the draft resolution lack solid legal and factual grounds. They do not rely on objective evidence. The Agency’s mandate is purely technical. It must never be weaponized for national agendas. Politically, this resolution is dangerous and entirely counterproductive. It completely ignores Iran’s extensive and continuous cooperation with the Agency. We have hosted countless inspections over the past 25 years. The most unprecedented inspections in the world have been conducted in Iran. Despite that, the Agency has never reported the diversion of even “one gram” of material in Iran. Yet, this draft ignores these basic facts. The reason is crystal clear: its sponsor -- the aggressor -- seeks to apply maximum pressure under the false guise of diplomacy. It rewards aggression and punishes the victim. This is not safeguards. This is hypocrisy. This draft claims to support a diplomatic solution. But it is coercion dressed as diplomacy. True diplomacy requires mutual respect. It does not work through coercion, pressure, and threats. You cannot demand serious engagement while holding a hostile resolution over our heads. This aggressive approach destroys trust. It does not build confidence. It will not lead to diplomacy. Overall, the draft replaces cooperation with coercion, portrays the oppressed as the aggressor, substitutes diplomacy with surrender, and replaces objective assessment with political assumptions.  The Board faces a critical choice today: to uphold the technical integrity of the IAEA or to allow it to become a mere political tool. If the Board adopts this draft, its action would constitute a clear instance of both abuse of process and abuse of power. Adopting this unfair and legally and factually flawed resolution is counterproductive. It will neither serve non-proliferation nor safeguards. Conversely, it will ruin trust, confidence, cooperation, and diplomacy as well as the Agency’s independence and credibility. In conclusion, the ultimate —yet delusional—objective of the US is to force the great Iranian nation into “surrender” and plunder its oil. Even despite two years of all-out warfare by the US itself, alongside all its allies, partners, and proxies, that goal was not achieved, nor will it ever be. They will never be able to redeem that defeat by forcing the adoption of a resolution through this Board. Accordingly, we urge the Board members to look at the objective facts and to vote against this flawed draft. Vote NO to protect the technical mandate of this Agency and to reject the politicization of the safeguards system, non-proliferation and the IAEA. I thank you, Mr. Chairman.