In the Name of God, the Compassionate and the Merciful At the outset, I would like to thank China for its initiative to propose this issue on the Board’s agenda. This is the twenty-fourth meeting at which the Board considers the AUKUS. Its consideration over past six years is, in itself, a clear indication of the serious concerns, ambiguities, and fundamental questions that remain unresolved. The failure to provide satisfactory answers to these concerns exposes the lack of transparency and the serious implications that continue to warrant the Board’s attention. In this regard, my delegation wishes to highlight the following principles concerning naval nuclear propulsion in the context of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy: All NPT State Parties have the inalienable right to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. As stated in the Article IV, nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting this inalienable right. Developing, building, or operating naval nuclear propulsion for non-proscribed military activities is an inherent right of non-nuclear-weapon States. This right must be exercised in full conformity with the NPT and CSAs, and it must not be subjected to any restrictions or preconditions. The NPT prohibits nuclear-weapon States from assisting non-nuclear-weapon States in acquiring nuclear weapons. From this perspective, AUKUS is of particular concern whereas it involves the transfer of large amount of weapon-grade nuclear material from nuclear-weapon States to a non-nuclear-weapon State. Potentially, such arrangements can contribute to nuclear-weapon sharing or so-called extended nuclear deterrence arrangements. Additionally, the AUKUS arrangement raises particular concerns due to the ambiguity surrounding the intended use of the nuclear material, and the possibility that weapon-related applications are not effectively excluded. The proposed transfer of substantial quantities of weapon-grade nuclear material to Australia, together with its exclusion from Agency safeguards for well over decades, warrants careful consideration of the risk of diversion. The information provided to date by the parties concerned has not sufficiently addressed these concerns. In this regard, greater transparency and a comprehensive, inclusive consideration of all relevant aspects, with the participation of all States, are essential. Developments related to AUKUS is confined to a single State and therefore must not, under any circumstances, establish or imply any additional standards, obligations, or requirements for Member States or the Agency, nor may they alter, expand, or otherwise prejudice the interpretation or application of existing legal obligations. I thank you Mr. Chair.