



**ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN**  
**MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS**

PERMANENT MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS OFFICE  
AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS  
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**Statement**

by

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before

**The IAEA Board of Governors**

on

**NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran** (*GOV/2022/26*)

9 June 2022  
Vienna, Austria

**Mr. Chair,**

With regard to the Report of Director General on NPT Safeguard Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran, contained in document GOV/2022/26, I would like to briefly draw the attention of this august body to the following comments and observations. For further details, I refer you and the delegations to the Explanatory Note circulated on June 3, 2022 by our Mission.

The Islamic Republic of Iran, as a responsible member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is committed to implement its obligations under its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA). In view of this, Iran has spared no effort to enable the Agency to smoothly carry out its verification activities based on the CSA in the Country. Iran's full cooperation with the IAEA has enabled the Agency to continue to maintain its knowledge through a robust verification system that is unique in the Agency's verification system.

The locations referred to in the Director General's report are based on fabricated allegations that were posed by the ill-intentioned Israeli regime. Although the Islamic Republic of Iran has categorically rejected veracity of those allegations, in light of further cooperation with the Agency, Iran agreed to conclude the joint statement of 26<sup>th</sup> of August 2020 which consequently led to the joint statement of 5<sup>th</sup> of March 2022 based on which the Vice-President of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) and the Director General of the IAEA agreed on a road map for the clarification of the issues mentioned in the report contained in document GOV/2021/52 of 17 November 2021.

This Joint Statement reflects Iran's respect for the Agency's procedures and practices and professional work as well as Iran's firm determination to cooperate in goodwill with the Agency. According to the Joint Statement, the AEOI and the IAEA agreed, in continuation of their previous cooperation, to accelerate and strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at the resolution of the remaining safeguards issues. That was a process that had to be completed at full length.

On 20 March 2022, in accordance with the aforementioned Joint Statement and within the determined time table, the Islamic Republic of Iran provided the Agency with all required information requested concerning the locations. During past months, in accordance with the process set out in the Joint Statement, Iran invited the senior Agency officials to hold 3 separate technical discussions in Tehran in order to exchange views, explanations and related supporting documents.

Since Iran has left no stone unturned in explaining and clarifying the issues, the Agency's current report on the issue was shocking to us. I would like to reiterate that the Islamic Republic of Iran has fulfilled all its commitments in this respect and addressed all the Agency's questions in a very substantive and cooperative manner.

I would like to emphasize that there is no undeclared nuclear material or equipment in Iran, and the Agency's allegation is merely based on false and fabricated information provided by the illegitimate Israeli regime. Iran has spared no effort to discover the origin of the particles and has shared its assumptions with the Agency. Iran could not find any technical reason for the presence of such uranium particles in those locations, and we seriously consider the reasonable possibility of sabotage by an external element.

**Mr. Chair,**

It should be pointed out that there are certain points in the report which are matters of concerns. For instance, in paragraph 3 of the Report, the Secretariat has conflated voluntary obligations under the Additional Protocol (AP) with obligations under the CSA. This is a mistake that misleads Member States and must be corrected. The same paragraph provides Member States with one-sided information; the Agency's statement in this paragraph which reads: "... *the Agency also provided Iran with detailed information...*" is neither accurate nor factual. The fact is that the Agency's requests were not initially considered by Iran because the Agency did not provide any authentic information for its requests relevant to the purpose of safeguards, which was seemingly being played simply as a cross-checking tool in the hands of an espionage agency.

We see the same method of providing incorrect and unsubstantiated information by the Secretariat throughout the report. For the sake of conciseness, I won't go

paragraph by paragraph to highlight the incorrect or false information within the presented report in my statement, and instead, I mention some instances as follow; for more details, I draw the delegations' attention to the aforementioned Explanatory Note.

- With regard to the uranium metal disk, Iran has stated frequently that the uranium metal had been produced previously only in Jaber Ibne Hayyan Laboratory (JHL) which has been verified many times by the Agency since 2003 and has been under the Agency's continuous C/S measures. The project was wholly verified by the Agency in the past and the issue was resolved. It is deplorable that the Agency reopens a closed issue dating back to 20 years ago based on fictitious information.
- Changing the name of Location 4 from Abadeh to Marivan is another example that strengthens our suspicion that there is an intention to mislead the international community and to tarnish Iran's image. The Agency had named heretofore Location 4 as "Abadeh". There was another location named Marivan which its issue was closed by the Agency's report Gov/2015/68 of 2 December 2015.
- The Agency's reference to the presence of neutron detectors in this location, principally has no safeguards ground. Despite this fact and although the Agency's questions were not based on authentic information relevant to the purpose of safeguards, the Islamic Republic of Iran based on its good-will, voluntarily granted access to the Agency and provided explanations regarding the history, usage and even the application of bunkers. The Agency has turned a blind eye to the extensive cooperation of Iran and considered the information provided by Iran as being inconsistent with the said alleged unauthentic fabricated documents, drawing a fallacious conclusion based on its own biased assumptions.
- The origin of presence of depleted uranium with U-236 mentioned in the analytical results of the Agency's environmental samples is unknown. However, it is clear that these particles do not have Iran's origin, rather have origin from companies such as Merck, Amersham and etc., which are commercially available in the market. It should not be difficult for the Agency to substantiate their

origins, believing its claim of having a rich library of the characteristics of particles. In this connection, we reiterate our position regarding the possibility of sabotage by an external element.

Mr. Chair,

The Islamic Republic of Iran believes that the Agency by referring to the above-said invalid information has overshadowed unfairly all Iran's cooperation with the Agency and its transparent peaceful nuclear activities. This approach does not match with the extensive cooperation of Iran with the Agency and the implementation of the most robust verification system being applied on Iran by the Agency.

The Agency should not disregard the possibility of involvement of Iran's staunch enemies in providing false and fabricated information to it and at the same time their role in possible perpetration of intentional contaminating of the locations in question, especially when they themselves repeatedly announce their intentions to disrupt entirely peaceful nuclear activities of Iran and attempts to undermine cooperation between Iran and the Agency.

In conclusion, **Mr. Chair**, I would also like to reiterate that the Islamic Republic of Iran has made every effort, even beyond its obligations under its CSA, to cooperate with the Agency. It should be highlighted that Iran's nuclear material and activities have been utterly declared to the Agency and have gone through a very robust verification. The Islamic Republic of Iran truly expects the Agency to conduct its reporting on verification activities in the Islamic Republic of Iran in a professional, impartial and independent manner and not to bend down to the political pressures.

**Thank you, Mr. Chair.**