Statement by H.E Reza Najafi before the Board of Governors of the IAEA Vienna 20 November 2025

Statement by H.E Reza Najafi Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran before the Board of Governors of the IAEA under Agenda Item 5(f): “NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran” (Vienna 20 November 2025)

Statement by H.E Reza Najafi,

Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran,

before the Board of Governors of the IAEA

under Agenda Item 5(f):  “NPT Safeguards Agreement with the Islamic Republic of Iran”

(Vienna, 20 November 2025)

In the Name of God, the Compassionate, the Merciful

Mr. Chair

At the outset, I would like to associate my delegation with the statement delivered by distinguished Ambassador of Venezuela on behalf of several member states. I would also like to take note of the Director General’s report on the peaceful nuclear program of Iran. The views of my delegation regarding the contents of the report are fully reflected in the Explanatory Note submitted by Iran and circulated as document INFCIRC/1327.

The Director General’s report (GOV/2025/65) clearly indicates that the present circumstances have resulted from the attacks carried out by the United States and the Israeli regime. It further affirms that the suspension of verification activities and the withdrawal of inspectors were consequences of the post-attack situation and constituted decisions taken by the Agency itself.

The report further affirms that, as a result of Iran’s cooperation and goodwill, verification activities have been resumed. It also notes that the Agency’s requests for access to ALL facilities not affected by the attacks were approved by Iran, and that inspectors were accordingly granted access to each of these facilities.

The Director General states in his report that the post-attack circumstances render the normal implementation of safeguards almost impossible and even security concerns forced the Agency to withdrew all of its inspectors.

The Director General also acknowledges and respects Iran’s domestic legal requirements and has expressed his readiness to take Iran’s security concerns into consideration.

These facts have been willfully ignored by certain parties. The United States and the E3 appear determined to close their eyes to all realities while making undue and excessive demands of Iran. This stance has been consistently pursued by them over recent years.

They seek to create the false impression that the situation is entirely normal, as if nothing has occurred. As has been the case previously, the E3 and the United States, maintaining an arrogant and self-assured posture, presume that Iran is obliged to continue its routine cooperation with the Agency even under bombardment! Contrary to their assertions, the situation is far from normal. Safeguarded nuclear facilities containing dangerous nuclear material have been attacked.

As the Deputy Director General for Safeguards rightly emphasized during the technical briefing session on 4 September 2025, the current circumstances are unprecedented in the Agency’s history. Never before has such heinous military attack been carried out against IAEA safeguarded nuclear facilities containing nuclear material.

Therefore, there exists no comparable precedent for the implementation of safeguards under circumstances of this nature. Nevertheless, Iran has continued its engagement with the Agency, and cooperation concerning facilities that were not attacked remains fully ongoing, in accordance with a specific procedure jointly agreed upon by Iran and the Agency to address Iran’s security concerns.

At this juncture, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s foremost priority concerning the facilities subjected to attacks is to implement necessary safety and environmental measures at the damaged sites, which are likely internally contaminated as a result of the recent acts of aggression.

Moreover, the persistent threat of renewed aggression—explicitly articulated by the perpetrators—has necessitated a state of heightened security alert across relevant sites. Under these extraordinary and volatile circumstances, it is neither safe nor feasible for Iranian technical personnel to be deployed to the affected sites and facilities.

The continued implementation of verification and monitoring activities in these facilities presupposes a minimum threshold of physical security, personnel safety, and institutional operability. In the present case, conditions resulting from acts of aggression have created exceptional circumstances, which has rendered the normal performance of verification obligations legally impossible and materially impracticable.

Distinguished Colleagues

Once again, the United States and France, Germany and the United Kingdom (E3) have submitted a draft resolution, deliberately designed to exert undue pressure on Iran and to propagate their wholly false and misleading narrative of the present situation.

The co-authors of this draft resolution, seems stone-deaf and visionless. Deaf—because they have ignored, even during two extraordinary meetings of the Board of Governors, the unequivocal warnings regarding the attacks on Iran’s IAEA-safeguarded nuclear facilities. Blind—because they have failed to acknowledge what is clearly stated in the Agency’s own report, namely that: “the Agency had been informed of a military operation launched by Israel, which included attacks on several of Iran’s nuclear facilities. These attacks took place between 13-24 June 2025. On 22 June 2025, the US conducted attacks on three of Iran’s nuclear facilities. The Agency stopped conducting verification activities in Iran at the commencement of the military attacks and, by the end of June 2025, had decided to withdraw all of its inspectors from Iran for safety reasons”.

They consistently adopt a self-righteous posture, intentionally fail to even mention the attacks. This omission is entirely predictable, given that one of the aggressors is the main sponsor of the resolution and seeks to mislead member states and evade any acknowledgment of its own unlawful act of aggression.

When the United States and the E3 are unwilling—or, due to their arrogant approach— are incapable of recognizing the root cause of the issue, they are clearly in no position to dictate or propose any solution to the current situation.

The text of the draft resolution is nothing more than a compilation of the positions of the United States and the E3, their inaccurate narrative of the issue, the misleading conflation of safeguards obligations with voluntary measures, and a clumsy attempt to introduce the so-called snapback within the Agency. Their failure in New York cannot be rectified in Vienna by this resolution.

The draft resolution incorporates language on negotiations, a diplomatic solution, and references to the inalienable rights of States under the NPT. This disingenuous wording stands in stark contrast to the real positions and actions of the United States and E3.

The President of the United States has, in various official statements and public addresses, openly taken responsibility for the acts of aggression against Iran—proudly asserting that the objective was the destruction of Iran’s nuclear facilities and enrichment capabilities. Furthermore, intoxicated by pride and arrogance, he boasts repeatedly of having ‘obliterated’.^[1]

The British Foreign Secretary has openly called for “zero enrichment”,^[2] while the German Chancellor, following the aggressions committed by Israel and the United States against Iran’s safeguarded nuclear sites and facilities, brazenly stated that “this is the dirty work that Israel does for all of us”.^[3]

In a surprising statement, the EU High Representative openly declared that the EU’s objective is to bring an end to Iran’s nuclear program.^[4] Clearly, this disordered ambition will never be realized.

In light of these explicit positions and the negotiating approach adopted by the co-authors of the resolution, how can the assertions made in the draft resolution regarding diplomacy and negotiation be regarded as genuine and credible?

Ironically, the draft while recalls the 2015 Board resolution (GOV/2025/72) that had already closed all past issues, at the same time, calls on Iran to resolve those very issues that were long ago conclusively resolved by that same resolution!

Distinguished Colleagues

Accordingly, we urge all responsible Member States to refrain from supporting the proposed draft resolution, as its adoption would be detrimental to the ongoing positive cooperative efforts between Iran and the Agency.

Certain Western parties who so loudly profess concern for the non-proliferation regime and for Iran’s compliance with it must confront a simple question: when the very depository of the NPT committed acts of aggression against Iran’s safeguarded nuclear facilities, why was there not even the slightest willingness to condemn such a grave violation? And when the certain members of Board of Governors chose silence in the face of these unlawful attacks, does this not expose the hollowness of their proclaimed concern for the integrity and credibility of the non-proliferation regime?

The Islamic Republic of Iran has consistently demonstrated that, in case of goodwill, seriousness, and a constructive approach from the other side, it is fully prepared for meaningful and constructive engagement.

At present, however, the co-authors of the resolution have chosen a different course, under the mistaken belief that pressure and threats will yield results. For them, diplomacy appears to deprive Iran from its inalienable rights—something the great nation of Iran will never accept.

I Thank you Mr. Chair

 

 

[1] The White House, President Trump Delivers Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly, September 23, 2025. https://www.whitehouse.gov/videos/president-trump-delivers-remarks-to-the-united-nations-general-assembly

[2] David Lammy, Commons Debate: "Middle East", House of Commons, 23 June 2025, available at: https://www.parallelparliament.co.uk/r/mp/florence-eshalomi/debate/2025-06-23/commons/commons-chamber/middle-east/contrib/3BAAE418-AA58-4EDA-98F8-E5838AA79A16

[3] Friedrich Merz, interview on ZDF, 17 June 2025, available at: https://www.zdf.de/politik/g7-gipfel-merz-100.html

[4] Kaja Kallas, statement on X, 26 June 2025, https://x.com/kajakallas/status/1940073048419487959